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THE CASE FOR TAX LOOPHOLES 
Presenting the case in favor of tax loopholes may seem to be an example of 
trying to defend the indefensible. Loophole, of course, is a perjorative term 
indicating some special advantage that a person or group has achieved, 
presumably at the expense of the public welfare. And, as we are told repeated-
ly, eliminating all of the loopholes would permit a massive reduction in tax 
rates without any overall decline in revenues. 
The implicit trade-off sounds so desirable that we may wonder why the 
change has not been made before. An obvious answer of course quickly comes 
to mind: the special interests have prevented it. Although that may be the 
popular answer, a quite different one will be presented here, one which is 
based on a broader view of public policy. We will examine the role of these 
special tax provisions in the light of the totality of governmental tax, expendi-
ture, and regulatory activities, especially as these affect the relationship of 
public to private activities in the United States.* But before doing so, we will 
cover some preliminary material. It will be helpful to examine the nature of 
the various loophole arrangements and their impacts on the tax system of 
which they have become so basic a part. 
Technically, the term loophole-at least in my understanding-applies to 
that broad and disparate range of specific provisions in the tax code which 
permits one or more taxpayers to depart from the general structure used for 
taxing income. To clear the air at the outset, I am not about to defend every 
"raid" on the Treasury. That is, I will not be supporting the desirability of 
each and every special provision of the Internal Revenue Code. As a general 
proposition, I do favor the economic notion of "horizontal equity" -that is, 
equal treatment of taxpayers in similar circumstances. And it should be recog-
nized that a "cleaner" tax code-one with fewer special provisions-likely 
would help to achieve a greater degree of horizontal equity. 
Yet, it needs to be acknowledged that there is room for a good degree of 
legitimate quibbling as to who are the equals to be treated equally. The tax-
payer who devotes a portion of his or her income to voluntary contributions to 
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eleemosynary institutions may quite properly be viewed ·a bit differently than 
the taxpayer with identical income who devotes all of that income to his or her 
personal gratifications. This would seem to be one of the many instances in life 
where sensible results are more likely to be achieved by carefully balancing a 
variety of important considerations, rather than single-mindedly attempting 
to pursue just one. 
In this brief examination of the composition of tax loopholes I will, of 
course, try to avoid the obvious distinction that those special tax provisions 
which benefit me are essential to the public welfare, but those that benefit you 
are just low priority giveaways. As Professor Boris Bittker explained on this 
campus on an earlier occasion, there are very few tax provisions which meet 
the formal dictionary definition of loophole, that is, "an ambiguity or omission 
in a statute, etc., which affords opportunity for evading its intention."l In the 
main, tax loopholes are not the product of an ingenious attorney or account-
ant laboriously examining the minutia of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather, 
the typical loophole was deliberately placed there by the Congress to achieve 
a public purpose, a purpose of which you or I may speak good or ill. Even as 
enthusiastic a critic of these special tax provisions as Professor Stanley Surrey 
has been moved to note that many of them "were expressly adopted to induce 
actions which the Congress considered in the national interest."2 
To belabor the obvious, the charitable deduction was not inserted in the 
tax system to provide windfall gains to the wealthy but, in Professor Surrey's 
words, "to foster philanthropy." As we are about to see, however, the pro-
viders of that philanthropy constitute a varied lot. 
THE NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF TAX EXPENDITURES 
As it turns out, there is a classification of special tax provisions which is 
available for our use. In recent years, the term tax expenditures has been ap-
plied to those features of the tax law which have often been labeled as 
loopholes. A formal definition is more descriptive, albeit somewhat formida-
ble: revenue losses attributable to provisions of the federal tax laws which 
allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income, or 
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax 
liability. 
Before turning to the data, however, a critique of the tax expenditure con-
cept is in order. On its surface, that dreadful phrase may seem to be an anoma-
ly: either something is a tax or it is an expenditure. According to Professor 
Surrey, who is generally acknowledged to be the father of the tax expenditure 
concept, "The term 'tax expenditure' has been used to describe those special 
provisions of the federal tax system which represent government expendi-
tures made through that system to achieve various social and economic objec-
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tives."3 The notion that the tax incentive device involves the expenditure of 
government funds is, in my opinion, a fundamental error, however, and one 
that leads to all sorts of erroneous public policy. 
The Surrey view seems to be based on the implicit assumption that the 
state is entitled to as much of the taxpayers' income as it desires. Hence, the 
citizen's claim on his or her own income is secondary or residual. Thus, any 
reduction in that How of private income to the public Treasury is viewed as an 
act of grace by a benevolent sovereign. To the contrary, a tax expenditure-if 
the concept is to have any justification-signifies less taking of private funds 
by government. This is a simple but powerful point. In my view, tax expendi-
tures should be seen in the context of the substantial taxes which are being 
paid by private individuals and corporations. To tell a person who is paying 
out over a third of his or her income in federal taxes that he or she is unduly 
benefiting from some tax expenditure reflects a strange view of tax ~quity. 
And to be told that by a beneficiary of the low income allowance compounds 
the insult. 
Tax expenditures or tax incentives are designed to alter private behavior 
in an economy already strongly influenced by government; they are intended 
specifically to increase private expenditure on a particular item or category. 
From a purely fiscal viewpoint, a dollar less paid in taxes has the same effect 
on the budget position as a dollar more disbursed by government. But, a 
variety of different consequences may How from choosing the tax or the ex-
penditure route for achieving public purposes. 
An important shortcoming of the tax expenditure concept arises from the 
method used in estimating the dollar magnitudes. The data reported do not 
take any of the indirect effects from the operation of each of these special tax 
provisions into account.4 Many of the tax expenditures alter taxpayer 
behavior and economic conditions. In many cases that is their purpose. Their 
elimination also might require offsetting changes in federal expenditure pro-
grams or in other aspects of the tax system in order to avoid obviously 
undesirable effects- but thus preventing the Treasury from recapturing the 
full revenue loss. The tax exemption of interest received on state and local 
bonds is an interesting case in point. On the surface, this provision appears 
merely to provide tax relief to the high bracket holders of these securities. 
And numerous tax reformers urge the prompt elimination of this "loophole" 
on that basis. But, on reflection, the tax exemption enables the states and 
localities to issue bonds at lower interest rates than other borrowers of com-
parable risk categories. (Certainly, the purchasers of these securities would 
turn to higher yield issues if the interest were to become taxable.) 
Thus, some of the tax expenditure also implicitly involves a substantial 
subsidy to the governmental units issuing these securities. In fact, the more 
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sophisticated tax reform proposals designed to eliminate or reduce the use of 
the tax-exempt securities do provide for the payment of federal subsidies to 
state and local governments to offset the higher interest payments that they 
would have to make in order to sell their securities in the "taxable market." 
Depending on the subsidy level, there could be a net loss or a net gain to the 
Treasury from the combination of closing the tax-exemption loophole and si-
multaneously subsidizing state and local governments to enable them to con-
tinue selling bonds at low interest costs.s 
Despite these and other shortcomings, the available data on tax expendi-
tures are useful in making some rough approximations of the distribution of 
the beneficiaries of tax loopholes. The results may well come as a surprise to 
many of the enthusiastic but less critical supporters of the concept. 
Some of the "tax expenditures" are well known and have become notori-
ous. A few ready examples are depletion allowances, the tax exemption of the 
interest on state and local bonds, and those provisions which have been used 
to shelter certain types of real estate income (such as expensing of interest and 
taxes paid during the construction of buildings). However, it may come as a 
surprise to many that these items comprise a relatively small portion of the 
$95 billion of tax expenditures-losses in revenue-reported by the Treasury 
Department in the fiscal year 1976.6 The great bulk of the $95 billion, rather, 
consists of items which I suspect the vast majority of the public never thinks of 
as a loophole. 
Among the largest tax expenditures, for example, are the deductibility of 
mortgage interest and property taxes on owner-occupied residences. The tax 
treatment of these two items of personal expense of the typical homeowner ac-
counts for a total of $8.9 billion of revenue foregone in the fiscal year 1976. 
Other significant special provisions include deducting charitable contribu-
tions ($5.4 billion revenue loss to the Treasury), personal, state, and local 
taxes, other than on homes ($8.0 billion) and excluding from taxation em-
ployer and self-employed contributions to employee pensions ($8.4 billion), 
medical insurance premiums and medical care programs for employees ($4.5 
billion), as well as social security and unemployment benefits ($7.0 billion). 
However, merely reciting specific examples such as these may give a dis-
torted picture of the total reality. Tables 2.1 and 2.2, therefore, are an attempt 
to show the overall distribution of tax expenditures by income class. The data 
on tax expenditures are taken from the official tabulation in the annual 
federal budget. The assignment of tax expenditure benefit to income classes is 
based on a Treasury Department study of 1971 data prepared for the Joint 
Economic Committee.7 I have divided the data into three categories-benefits 
to the lower-income groups, to middle-income groups, and to upper-income 
groups. 
The amounts shown in the category "lower-income groups" are based on 
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the proportion of each tax expenditure in 1971 received by those taxpayers 
with adjusted gross income of $10,000 or less. The data for the "middle-in-
come groups" are based on the proportion of each tax expenditure in the base 
year going to taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $10,000 to $50,000. 
Frankly, I would have preferred using a lower top limit for the middle group-
ing, but the Treasury did not split up the category, $20,000 to $50,000. Never-
theless, the bulk of the tax expenditures (56 percent in 1971) was received by 
the bottom half of the middle group-those reporting adjusted gross incomes 
of $10,000 to $20,000. The "upper-income groups" in these tables consist of 
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $50,000 and over. I have made no at-
tempt to trace through the incidence of the tax expenditures received by cor-
porations, although I would expect that a substantial portion of the ultimate 
benefit is received by lower-income and middle-income groups. 
The public finance literature provides a variety of viewpoints. Personally, I 
subscribe to a mixed case, in which some of the benefits are shifted forward to 
consumers in the form of lower prices, some are shifted backward to employ-
ees in the form of higher incomes and fringe benefits, and some significant 
amount benefits the shareholders. Examples of probable backward shifting, 
although relatively small, may be the most apparent. I have in mind here the 
tax credit for employing welfare recipients and the increase in the investment 
credit for the companies that use the proceeds to finance employee stock 
ownership plans. 
Table 2.1 
SUMMARY OF TAX EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1976 
(in billions of dollars) 
Estimated benefits to lower 
income groups 
Estimated benefits to middle 
income groups 
Estimated benefits to upper 
income groups 
Estimated benefits to 
corporations 
Total 
Source: Summary of details shown in Table 2.2 
Amount 
$17.9 
38.6 
15.9 
22.9 
95.3 
Percent of Total 
19 
40 
17 
24 
100 
As shown in Table 2.1, the bulk of all the estimated tax expenditures are 
received by lower- and middle-income taxpayers-$56.5 billion out of $95.3 
billion in 1976, or 59 percent of the total. By and large, the major recipients of 
the tax expenditure benefits received by personal (as contrasted to corporate) 
taxpayers are those in the middle-class category-$38.6 billion compared to 
$17.9 billion for the lower-income category and $15.9 billion for the upper-in-
come category. 
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Table 2.2 continued 
Benefit Primarily to Middle-Income Group 
Several large tax expenditures benefit primarily lower-income taxpayers. Exclusion of military disability pensions 22 48 20 90 
Among these are the tax exemption of various government transfer or benefit Exclusion of veterans' pensions 7 16 7 30 
payments which are received primarily by low-income people who would Exclusion of G.I. Bill benefits 73 162 70 305 
otherwise have to pay taxes on such income, e.g., veteran's disability compen- Additional exemption for over 65 275 607 263 1,145 
sation payments ($595 million of revenue foregone), social security benefits Retirement income credit and credit for 
($2. 7 billion), and unemployment benefits ($3.3 billion). the elderly 26 58 26 110 
To be sure, several important types of tax expenditures tend to benefit pri- Exclusion of capital gain on home if over 
65 10 21 9 40 
marily corporations and investors and other relatively high-bracket income 
Exclusion of railroad retirement system 
earners. Examples in this category include the special tax treatment of capital benefits 46 101 43 190 
gains ($7.9 billion), the investment credit ($9.5 billion), the exclusion ofinter-
Benefits for dependents and survivors 155 342 148 645 
est on state and local debt ($4.8 billion), and the excess of percentage over Exclusion of special benefits for disabled 
cost depletion ($1.3 billion). Clearly, the $95.3 billion of tax expenditures in coal miners 12 27 11 50 
the fiscal year 1976 cannot be characterized as merely an array of depletion Exclusion of income earned abroad by 
allowances and other very specialized or esoteric tax provisions. U.S. citizens 32 110 3 145 
Table 2.2 shows the great variety of the specific tax expenditures for which Expensing of certain capital outlays by farmers 159 241 55 85 540 
the Treasury Department publishes estimated dollar magnitudes. A detailed Capital gains treatment of certain 
analysis of the derivation of the income class distributions is contained in the income of farmers 110 167 38 10 325 
statistical appendix. Dividend exclusion 90 288 52 430 
Deduction of interest on consumer credit 316 1,684 105 2,105 
Table 2.2 Deduction of mortgage interest on 
residences 779 3,799 292 4,870 
ESTIMATED TAX EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1976 
Deduction of property taxes on (in millions of dollars) 
residences 564 2,902 564 4,030 
Item of Tax Expenditure Benefit To Income Group Depreciation on rental housing in excess 
Lower Middle Upper Corpo- of straight line 49 194 162 100 505 
Income Income Income rations Total Housing rehabilitation 3 15 7 15 40 
Benefit Primarily to Lower-Income Group Exclusion of workers' compensation 
benefits 283 295 12 590 
Exclusion of benefits and allowances to Exclusion of pension contributions and 
armed forces personnel 765 245 10 1,020 
earnings 1,980 5,383 987 8,350 
Disability insurance benefits 277 46 7 330 Exclusion of employer-paid premiums 
Exclusion of social security benefits 2,153 491 81 2,725 on accident and life insurance 217 556 57 830 
Additional exemption for the blind 14 6 20 Exclusion of employer-paid medical 
Exclusion of sick pay 101 90 4 195 insurance premiums and medical 
Exclusion of unemployment benefits 1,968 1,334 33 3,335 care 1,212 3,008 270 4,490 
Exclusion of public assistance benefits 95 95 Exclusion of employer provided meals 
Deduction and credit for child and and lodging 133 164 13 310 
dependent care expenses 241 49 290 Exclusion of income of trusts to finance 
Exclusion of scholarships and fellowships 144 51 195 supplementary unemployment 
benefits 4 6 10 
Exclusion of veteran's disability 
Exclusion of interest on life insurance 
compensation 309 280 6 595 
savings 215 1,225 215 1,655 
Excess of percent standard deduction 
Deduction of charitable contributions 531 2,496 1,843 540 5,410 over low-income allowance 855 274 11 1,140 
Earned income credit 165 53 2 220 Deduction of medical expenses 764 1,389 162 2,315 
Deduction of casualty losses 84 167 59 310 
Subtotal 7,087 2,919 154 10,160 
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Table 2.2 continued 
Parental personal exemptions for 
students, age 19 and over 
Deduction of nonbusiness state and local 
taxes 
Credit and deduction for political 
contributions 
Deferral of capital gain on home sale 
Credit for purchase of new home 
Deferral of interest on savings bonds 
Excess first-year depreciation 
Maximum tax on earned income 
Subtotal 
Benefit Primarily to Upper Income Group 
Capital gains 
Capital gains treatment of royalties on 
coal and iron ore 
Subtotal 
Benefit Primarily to Corporations 
Investment credit 
Credit for employing AFDC and public 
assistance recipients 
Depreciation on buildings (other than 
housing) in excess of straight line 
Employee stock ownership plans 
financed through investment credit 
Exemption of credit unions 
Exclusion of certain income of 
cooperatives 
Corporate surtax exemption 
Capital gains treatment of certain timber 
income 
Expensing of exploration and 
development costs 
Excess of percentage over cost depletion 
Exclusion of interest on state and local 
debt 
Expensing of research and development 
Expensing of construction period 
interest and taxes 
Exclusion of gross-up on dividends of 
LDC corporations 
Deferral of income of Domestic 
International Sales Corporations 
Special tax rate for western hemisphere 
trade corporations 
Deferral of tax on shipping companies 
209 
823 
8 
135 
104 
418 
4,584 
19 
659 
507 
132 292 
29 94 
145 321 
9,736 32,365 
8 
439 
2 
441 
507 
24 
-33 
11 
14 
23 
17 
5 
52 
1,830 
10 
1,840 
923 
96 
-104 
28 
59 
105 
263 
17 
114 
93 
2,558 
8 
51 
39 
126 
17 
139 
8,524 
5,051 
28 
5,079 
380 
80 
-18 
56 
87 
157 
1,365 
3 
49 
720 
7,965 
35 
845 
650 
550 
40 180 
605 
790 51,415 
545 
15 
560 
7,685 
10 
225 
25 
145 
410 
4,170 
290 
640 
1,010 
3,115 
1,325 
415 
40 
1,220 
50 
110 
7,865 
55 
7,920 
9,495 
10 
425 
25 
145 
255 
4,170 
385 
800 
1,295 
4,760 
1,350 
630 
40 
1,220 
50 
110 
Table 2.2 continued 
Railroad rolling stock five-year 
amortization 
Excess bad debt reserve of financial 
institutions 
Credit for corporations in U.S. 
possessions 
Subtotal 
Total 
620 1,501 
17,884 38,625 
-25 -25 
485 485 
240 240 
2,159 21,585 25,865 
15,916 22,935 95,360 
Source: Data in total column and for corporations taken from Special Analyses, Budget of the 
United States Government, Fiscal Year 79 78. 
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TAX INCENTIVES 
Many justifications have be·en put forward for the various special tax provi-
sions. Typical national objectives cited by the proponents have ranged from 
fostering employment and economic growth, to enhancing equity, to support-
ing worthy private institutions and state and local governments. The specific 
weight given to any of these objectives is, of course, a rather subjective matter. 
The special treatment of the major tax expenditures received by upper-in-
come taxpayers and corporations-capital gains, the investment credit, and 
similar items-is justified by the need to promote investment and hence 
achieve a growing economy, which will provide both more employment and a 
rising standard of living for the public as a whole. We need to recall also that 
the special tax treatment of capital gains was instituted prior to the insertion 
of the income-averaging concept into the Internal Revenue Code. In that ear-
lier period, were capital gains to have been taxed at ordinary income rates, 
many taxpayers would have been paying taxes on long-term gains far higher 
than the brackets that would correspond to their income levels during the 
period in which those gains were accruing (that is the "bunching" 
phenomenon). Now that income averaging has been extended to capital 
gains, the primary justification for differential treatment must be viewed in 
other terms-providing desired inducements to investment. We should be 
aware of the obvious: to the extent that the private sector is unable to raise the 
funds to finance economic growth, pressure rises for greater governmental in-
volvement in business affairs. 
Surely in recent years the federal government has become an important 
competitor for investment funds. The Treasury's financing of budget deficits 
plus a growing array of federally owned or federally sponsored credit agencies 
have obtained one-third or more of the total funds flowing through the 
nation's capital markets.s Viewed from this prospective, the various tax ex-
penditures devoted to encouraging private investment may merely offset the 
deleterious effects of the government's own expenditure and borrowing activ-
ities. 
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Turning to another major tax expenditure, the deductibility of state and 
local taxes furthers the objective of strengthening the other levels of govern-
ment through the federal government's sharing the burden of the taxes levied 
by these jurisdictions. This can be viewed as an early "revenue sharing" 
effort. Moreover-in the absence of this deduction or a provision with similar 
effect-the combination of federal, state, and local income taxes for some tax-
payers could result in a total rate close to 100 percent of income, thus border-
ing on sheer confiscation. When the top bracket of the federal income tax was 
93 percent, this was a very real possibility. 
Numerous reasons are cited for the tax deductibility of charitable con-
tributions. The voluntary, private institutions thus supported provide diver-
sity and free choice. They can experiment and enter fields too controversial 
for government agencies. They often take on responsibilities which otherwise 
would be financed entirely by tax revenues.9 
The deductibility of interest paid by individuals (that is, interest on per-
sonal as opposed to business indebtedness) is a more complicated matter. The 
largest portion is interest on mortgages on owner-occupied homes. The 
deterioration of many central cities in recent years has strengthened the 
justification of enhancing family and neighborhood stability by encouraging 
individual home ownership. The deductibility of interest on general consumer 
debt may be more difficult to defend. Personally, I find it hard to see why the 
general taxpayer should subsidize the families that wish to go into debt to buy 
new refrigerators or second cars. In contrast, the interest that individuals re-
ceive on their savings is, of course, fully taxable. Perhaps, although uninten-
tionally, this provision also illustrates the tendency of the tax system to tilt in 
favor of consumption rather than saving. 
Some personal deductions are really reasonable refinements of gross in-
come in order to obtain a fair and equitable concept of a taxable income base. 
Cases in point are the deductions of expenses related to earning income, such 
as union dues, child care for working wives, work clothing, and fees on safe 
deposit boxes for securities. A few corporate tax exemptions-notably the ex-
emption of credit unions and some of the income of cooperatives-are an aid 
to those nonprofit institutions organized in the corporate form. 
As in each of the other cases cited here, I am making no attempt to assess 
the adequacy of these justifications, but merely to emphasize that there is 
another side to the traditional tax reform arguments. Although most popular 
discussions of tax reform tend to ignore the substantive purposes of many of 
these special tax provisions, the underlying literature of public finance does 
not. In the most definitive study of personal tax deductions, for example, Pro-
fessor C. Harry Kahn states that these tax provisions are designed to 
"differentiate between taxpayers whose incomes, though apparently equal, 
are of different sizes in some relevant sense."lO 
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Thus, without prejudging their effectiveness, we should note that at least 
some special tax provisions (perhaps the additional exemption for the blind or 
the deduction of casualty losses) are intended to further the achievement of 
horizontal equity-equal treatment of equals. Professor Kahn goes on to state 
that "care must be taken not to designate the tax equivalents [the revenue 
foregone from personal deductions] as simple tax losses. If intended to spur 
private expenditures, for instance, in the philanthropic domain, the figures 
represent more accurately the tax cost to the government of encouraging ex-
penditures which might otherwise have to be undertaken by government."ll 
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TAX INCENTIVE APPROACH 
Surely the Internal Revenue Code contains numerous "marginal" sub-
sidies, in which modest tax benefits enable the private sector to continue some 
worthy undertakings (hospitals or orphanages, for example) at a fraction of 
the cost which the federal Treasury would have to bear should the activities 
be run by the state. But there also are tax "shelters" in the Code which pro-
vide an inordinate amount of benefit to the recipients or cost to the Treasury, 
far out of proportion to their value to society as a whole. 
Special tax provisions (tax expenditures) have been criticized on numer-
ous grounds. Many of them, especially the deductions from income, are at-
tacked as being regressive, because they reduce the tax burdem of upper-in-
come taxpayers more than those of lower-income taxpayers. Deductions 
clearly do have that effect. Under the deduction approach, the amount of tax 
saving per dollar of deductible expenditure depends on the marginal tax 
bracket of the taxpayer. Thus, an upper-income taxpayer receives a larger tax 
reduction than does a lower-income taxpayer for making the same dollar 
amount of charitable contribution or payment of state and local taxes. 
In effect, the government subsidizes the taxpayer to the extent of 14· per-
cent of the state and local taxes and charitable contributions. for the individu-
al or family in the lowest tax bracket-when they itemize rather than take the 
standard deduction. In the case of those in the top bracket, the government 
subsidizes 70 percent of those expenditures, and somewhere in between for 
the others. The many taxpayers using the standard deductions receive no tax 
benefits from their contributions,l2 
From the viewpoint of achieving desired public policy objectives, special 
tax provisions lack some of the compelling characteristics of direct expendi-
tures. Typical-but not all-direct expenditure programs offer the following 
advantages: the public has a clearer picture of the flow of federal assistance; 
the Congress can exercise annual control over the size and distribution of the 
benefits; the financial aid given to private individuals and groups can be 
weighed against the desirability of government agencies taking direct respon-
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sibility for the programs in question. This idyllic view, however, is not readily 
reconcilable with the reality of trends in the federal budget. In recent years, 
the relatively "uncontrollable" expenditure programs-social security pen-
sions, interest on the public debt, unemployment compensation, etcetera-
have come to dominate total federal spending. In fact, many of these pro-
grams do not even appear in the annual appropriation bills but are funded via 
so-called permanent and indefinite appropriations.13 
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 
As pointed out earlier in this paper, this is not a plea for the retention of 
every special provision in the tax system. To an economist, it is reasonable to 
contrast the costs and benefits of various mechanisms for achieving public 
policy objectives. It certainly is conceivable that, in some cases, direct ex-
penditures may be a more desirable alternative than tax incentives. In other 
cases, credit assistance or regulatory programs or still other approaches may 
be preferred, such as just letting the market work. There seems to be little 
need to take a doctrinaire attitude and prohibit public policy from using any 
one of these alternatives. Rather, the advantages and disadvantages of each 
mechanism should be weighed, and the most desirable one used to achieve a 
specific objective, be it the encouragement of business investment or the dis-
couragement of environmental pollution. 
However, the implications of moving from indirect support through the 
tax system to direct federal expenditure subsidies are profound, especially in 
the many instances of aid to private, state, and local institutions. Taken 
literally (as has been suggested by some tax reformers), this move would mean 
putting private hospitals, orphanages, schools, and similar social service and 
charitable institutions into the federal budget.l4 The opportunities for federal 
influence and control over the conduct of these private organizations would 
be obvious and could be very considerable. 
Moreover, the constitutional separation of church and state would proba-
bly prevent extending such direct general purpose financial support to 
church-related medical and educational facilities and certainly to the religious 
institutions themselves. The choice between tax incentives and direct federal 
expenditures turns out to involve more than the selection among technical 
financing mechanisms. The choice involves altering the balance between pub-
lic and private power in our society. The issue is seldom clearly joined, which 
may explain why the debate gets so heated at times. 
However, the use of the tax incentive route does not require adhering to 
the specific types of tax mechanisms now in use. For example, the deduction 
from taxable income is not the only way in which the tax system can be used 
to encourage taxpayers to spend some of their money in a manner which ac-
12 
cords with national interests. It is merely an example of the power of the 
status quo. Deductions have been part of the system since the institution of 
the income tax law in 1913. 
An alternative to the deduction is already available and has been used in 
various specific instances: the tax credit, which is a deduction from the ulti-
mate tax liability rather than from taxable income. Although the distinction 
between credits and deductions may be considered to be a technical matter 
only of interest to specialists, the differences in effects may be very significant 
for the individual taxpayer. Given the progressive nature of the personal in-
come tax structure, ordinary deductions are implicitly regressive. Credits can 
be more flexible. A credit can be given in terms of a percentage of an expendi-
ture, and various ceilings may be put on the amount of the credit. Moreover, 
credits can be extended to that vast portion of low and moderate income tax-
payers that do not itemize indiv.idual contributions, but use the standard 
deduction. 
The credit concept is in widespread use in the corporate tax structure, 
where its use ranges from encouraging the employment of welfare recipients 
to expanding business plant and equipment. In the individual tax system, 
credits are now provided for child and dependent care expenses, retirement 
income, and political contributions-sometimes as a voluntary alternative to 
the deductions. Suggestions to use tax credits in place of personal exemp-
tions-$750 is the present deduction for each taxpayer and dependent-have 
been made by President Carter and Vice-President Mondale, among others. 
As pointed out earlier, the value of a deductible dollar varies with the tax-
payer's bracket. With a fixed percentage credit, in contrast, a given dollar of 
charitable outlay, for example, would generate the same amount of tax sav-
ing, regardless of the taxpayer's income level. Of course, the upper-bracket 
taxpayers might make a larger donation and thus qualify for a larger absolute 
tax benefit, but they would receive the same proportional benefit. Depending 
on the percentage allowed as the credit, such a system could reinforce the pro-
gressivity of the personal income tax, since those taxpayers whose marginal 
rates were below the percentage credit would have their average bill reduced. 
Those in the higher brackets would find their tax bills raised if credits were 
substituted for deductions. 
The mechanism of a tax credit could be important in strengthening the 
role of voluntary organizations in our national life by making them more dem-
ocratic. Because the proposed tax credit would operate to the advantage of 
lower- and moderate-income taxpayers, it could help to create a potential new 
constituency for private institutions, freeing many of them from their present 
dependence on the wealthy few. Unlike the alternative of direct support 
through government expenditures, substituting tax credits for personal 
deductions would constitute a modest step toward decentralizing decision-
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making in our society and encouraging diversity in the way that social objec-
tives are achieved. 
One would wish to cite a less shopworn metaphor, but the typical tax re-
former tends to concentrate on the hole rather than on the doughnut. U nfor-
tunately, the existing situation seems to be a fine example of the Lord (or the 
Feds, rather) giveth and the Feds taketh away. Private institutions in the 
United States, of course, were alive, well, and growing prior to their support 
through the income tax system. No doubt the powerful combination of heavy 
taxation and the expansion of public philanthropy and functions has adverse-
ly affected both the ability and the incentive of private citizens to support pri-
vate undertakings and has led to the need for offsetting aid via the tax incen-
tive route. 
As has been amply demonstrated in another connection, a major long-term 
barrier to private sector saving and investment is the large governmental 
budget deficits whose financing is competitive with private undertakings. If 
the public sector were smaller and its intrusion into the private sector substan-
tially reduced, there might be little need to advocate supporting private in-
stitutions via the tax system. To be sure, some private interests-be they busi-
ness, labor, agriculture, or any other-will always try to enrich themselves at 
the expense of the public welfare. But that knowledge should not cause us to 
overlook the fundamentally adverse impacts of government action on the pri-
vate sector. 
Perhaps we have come full circle. The aims of the conventional tax reform-
ers and the objectives of the apparent defenders of the status quo may not be 
as far apart as they initially appear to be. The reconciliation of the two sets of 
objectives may lie in the more widespread understanding of the conditions 
that led to the adoption of so many of the special tax provisions in the first 
place. The simple elimination of these tax provisions often would leave 
unfulfilled the objectives that they are designed to foster. Yet a more effective 
approach to public policy might be in dealing with the basic conditions that 
often prevent private institutions-business and nonprofit alike-from per-
forming their intended functions, conditions that frequently-and on occa-
sion unwittingly-result from the rapid expansion of governmental activities. 
Dealing with those basic conditions would have the added advantage of 
avoiding the revenue losses and the equity problems that may result from 
using tax incentives. 
One example, among many, may help to particularize this general notion. 
As many studies have demonstrated, the compulsory minimum wage law 
tends to price low-skilled and less-educated workers, especially teenagers, out 
of the labor market. To some extent, this adverse effect is offset by tax credits 
which are intended to encourage employers to give jobs to this target popula-
tion. I am confident that if both programs were eliminated simultaneously, 
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employment would rise, the budget deficit would be reduced, and the general 
welfare would be enhanced. But to eliminate the tax expenditure while ignor-
ing the underlying problem, as seems to be the traditional approach to tax re-
form, would be another exercise in futility. 
Similarly, the need for tax incentives to encourage private support of edu-
cational institutions arises in large part from the adverse effects of other 
governmental actions. The rapid expansion of classrooms and educational 
buildings in public institutions has frequently resulted in much of the higher 
educational system operating far below capacity and thus pushing up unit 
costs. (More generous scholarships directly paid to students would have been 
a far more efficient approach.) These upward cost pressures are in addition to 
_the basic inflation engendered by federal fiscal and monetary policy. 
A similar situation arises in the health field. The overly rapid expansion of 
hospitals has resulted in empty beds with attendant upward pressures on unit 
costs. And, further, the inflation in health care costs resulting from the 
government's medicare and medicaid programs has exacerbated the financial 
squeeze facing private health care institutions. 
It is cavalier, to say the least, for the naive tax reformers to blithely ignore 
all of the adverse impacts of government action on private institutions and 
then pick on one of the few areas of public policy-tax expenditures-where 
the public sector attempts to undo the damage. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper l have attempted to show that a sympathetic examination of 
"loopholes" or tax expenditures, to use the more technical and quantifiable 
term, can be useful. The mechanism of tax expenditures or incentives may 
serve a variety of public purposes, ranging from promoting business invest-
ment and economic growth to encouraging private, voluntary organizations. 
Indeed, the growth of tax expenditures may be viewed as a reaction to the 
severe impacts that the expansion of government power and activities has had 
on the viability of private sector institutions. But the prompt elimination of 
those obstacles, such as large deficit financing and pervasive government reg-
ulation, seems to be an unrealistic expectation. Hence, the reliance on second-
best alternatives, such as tax expenditures, may on occasion be a sensible 
route. 
The survey of the specific tax expenditures undertaken here reveals that, 
in the main, they are not special benefits to the highest-income classes nor the 
product of ingenious accountants or attorneys. Rather, the typical tax ex-
penditure benefits primarily middle- and lower-income groups of the popula-
tion. Nor are the major tax expenditures obtained by engaging in unusual ac-
tivities. Rather, they are received from such prosaic activities as paying state 
and local taxes, owning a home, and working for a company that provides 
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group insurance and other fringe benefits. 
To be sure, not all tax expenditures are of this nature-and not each one 
needs to be defended. But the point being made here is that neither should the 
entire category be condemned and its elimination urged as an unequivocal 
matter of equity. 
As pointed out in this paper, there are reforms which could be instituted-
such as more widespread use of the tax credit device-to simultaneously help 
to achieve greater progressivity in the tax structure and still serve to attain 
the basic purposes intended by the Congress. 
Given the current interest in tax reform, it seems evident that proposed 
changes should be viewed in a broader context than in the past. Questions of 
income distribution and macroeconomic policy have tended to dominate the 
discussion of tax reform. But we must also address such other important 
aspects as the effects on the respective roles of the public and private sectors 
and of federal, state, and local governments and the resultant shifts in the dis-
tribution of power in the society. 
All in all, tax incentives may, in this imperfect world, often be the most re-
alistic available alternative to achieving such important objectives as enhanc-
ing economic growth and employment, strengthening state and local govern-
ments, and encouraging a diversity of private, voluntary approaches to meet-
ing society's needs. 
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